Overview
Pickle Finance launched in September 2020 during the height of "DeFi Summer," positioning itself as a yield optimizer that would automatically compound DeFi yields for depositors. The protocol used "Pickle Jars" (yield vaults similar to Yearn's yVaults) and "Pickle Farms" (liquidity mining incentives) to attract TVL. PICKLE token emissions provided additional incentives, and the protocol briefly attracted hundreds of millions in deposits.
In November 2020, just two months after launch, Pickle Finance was exploited for approximately $19.7 million in DAI. The attack used a sophisticated "evil jar" technique where the attacker created a malicious jar contract that mimicked a legitimate Pickle Jar, then exploited Pickle's controller contract to transfer funds from a legitimate jar to the attacker-controlled evil jar. The vulnerability was in how Pickle's controller validated jar addresses — it failed to verify that jars were actually part of the protocol.
Following the exploit, Pickle merged with the Yearn Finance ecosystem as part of a broader DeFi merger wave (alongside Cream, SushiSwap, and others). However, the merger did not revive Pickle's adoption. The protocol continued to operate yield optimization strategies but at negligible scale compared to its brief peak. By 2024-2025, Pickle Finance is effectively defunct as a meaningful protocol.
Smart Contracts
Pickle Jars and Controller
Pickle's architecture consisted of Jar contracts (vaults that held user funds and executed yield strategies) and a Controller contract that managed the interaction between jars, strategies, and the underlying DeFi protocols. The fatal vulnerability was in the Controller's jar validation logic — it did not adequately verify that a jar calling for fund transfers was a legitimate, protocol-approved jar.
Strategy Contracts
Each Pickle Jar used a Strategy contract to execute yield optimization (compounding Curve yields, harvesting farm rewards, etc.). These strategies interacted with external DeFi protocols, creating a complex web of contract interactions with multiple points of potential failure.
Unaudited at Launch
Pickle Finance launched with minimal audit coverage — a common practice during DeFi Summer when speed-to-market was prioritized over security. The protocol's rapid development and deployment without comprehensive security review directly contributed to the exploit.
Security
November 2020 Evil Jar Exploit ($19.7M)
The "evil jar" attack was elegant and devastating:
- The attacker created a malicious contract that masqueraded as a legitimate Pickle Jar.
- They exploited the Controller contract's insufficient validation of jar addresses.
- Through the evil jar, they called the Controller's
swapExactJarForJarfunction, which transferred DAI from a legitimate jar (cDAI strategy) to the evil jar. - The attacker withdrew the DAI from their malicious jar and escaped with $19.7M.
The vulnerability was a fundamental access control failure — the Controller trusted any contract that claimed to be a jar, without verification against a whitelist or other authentication mechanism.
Post-Exploit Response
The exploit triggered a rapid response including contract pausing and vulnerability patching. The Yearn merger provided additional security resources. However, the damage was done — both financially and reputationally.
DeFi Summer Context
Pickle's exploit must be understood in the context of DeFi Summer 2020, when dozens of yield protocols launched with minimal testing, no audits, and anonymous teams. The speed of deployment and the absence of security practices was systemic to the era. This context explains but does not excuse the vulnerability.
Yield Generation
Historical Strategies
Pickle Jars implemented various yield strategies: compounding Curve/Convex yields, farming and selling governance tokens, providing liquidity in high-APR pools. During DeFi Summer, these strategies could generate genuinely high returns driven by token emission bonanzas.
Post-Exploit Decline
After the exploit and market normalization, Pickle's yield strategies became uncompetitive. The protocol lacked the development resources and TVL to optimize strategies effectively. Yearn Finance, with its larger team and more sophisticated vault infrastructure, offered superior yield optimization.
Effectively Inactive
Current Pickle Finance operations are negligible. Few strategies are actively maintained, and TVL is near zero. Users seeking yield optimization should use established protocols like Yearn Finance, Convex Finance, or Beefy Finance.
Adoption
DeFi Summer Brief Peak
At peak (October 2020), Pickle attracted several hundred million in TVL driven by PICKLE emissions and the yield optimization narrative. The protocol briefly had a vibrant community and active governance discussions.
Post-Exploit Collapse
The $19.7M exploit caused immediate and irreversible adoption collapse. Users fled, TVL plummeted, and community engagement cratered. The Yearn merger provided a lifeline but could not resurrect meaningful adoption.
Effectively Dead
Pickle Finance is functionally dead as a protocol. Website activity, TVL, and community engagement are negligible. The protocol serves primarily as a historical case study rather than an active DeFi product.
Tokenomics
PICKLE Token
PICKLE was distributed through liquidity mining with a fixed emission schedule. The token briefly traded at significant valuations during DeFi Summer before collapsing post-exploit. DILL (locked PICKLE) provided boost mechanisms similar to Curve's veCRV.
Token Collapse
PICKLE has declined over 99% from all-time highs. With no meaningful protocol activity, the token has no revenue source, no utility, and no governance value. Thin trading liquidity means the token is essentially illiquid.
Unrealizable Model
The Curve-inspired ve tokenomics (DILL locks for boosted rewards) is theoretically sound but requires protocol activity to function. With near-zero TVL and volume, the tokenomics model is academic.
Risk Factors
- PROTOCOL IS EFFECTIVELY DEAD. Near-zero TVL and no meaningful activity.
- $19.7M evil jar exploit in November 2020 destroyed user funds and trust.
- No active development — protocol is unmaintained.
- PICKLE token is effectively worthless with 99%+ decline from ATH.
- Smart contracts are unmaintained — potential for undiscovered vulnerabilities.
- No recovery prospects — market has moved to superior yield optimization platforms.
- Any remaining deposits should be withdrawn immediately.
Conclusion
Pickle Finance is a relic of DeFi Summer 2020 — a yield optimizer that launched too fast, without adequate security, and paid the price with a $19.7 million exploit within two months of launch. The evil jar attack exploited a fundamental access control failure that proper auditing would have caught. The Yearn merger provided a safety net but couldn't revive the protocol's adoption.
The 2.0 overall score reflects a protocol that failed in its core mission (security), lost all meaningful adoption, and has no viable path to recovery. Pickle's value is entirely as a case study: it demonstrates the catastrophic consequences of launching DeFi protocols without adequate security review, the difficulty of recovering from a major exploit, and the fleeting nature of emission-driven adoption. Study Pickle Finance's exploit. Don't use Pickle Finance.